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How should a practicing attorney protect his fee for services rendered
and to be rendered if the client has only one asset which is the subject
of the dispute for which the attorney was hired? If the attorney is
representing a defendant, a contingent fee would be inappropriate be-
cause if the defendant wins he is in the same position and the lawsuit
has not produced a "res" out of which the contingent fee can be paid.
Furthermore, except for Japan, the contingent fee historically has not
been used for the defense of cases.' It must have seemed, to the attorney
who was representing the record title holder of twenty acres soon to
be in dispute, that the only alternative was to take an interest in the
property itself when told that his client had no money to pay for his
services. After all, this is precisely what the Honorable Huey P. Long
had done in the 1921 case of McClung v. Atlas Oil Company,2 which
was affirmed later by Gautreaux v. Harang.3 Both of these decisions
concluded that Civil Code article 2447 was not violated if the attorney
took an interest in the soon to be disputed property prior to the filing
of a suit and an answer.4 In addition to McClung and Gautreaux, the
attorney had the public records doctrine5 firmly in his corner. As we
will see in further discussion on conflict of interest, the attorney was
dead wrong.
Advertising and Solicitation
In the wake of Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association,6 the Louisiana
State Bar Association recommended an amendment to Model Rules of
Copyright 1989, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Kreindler, The Contingent Fee: Whose Interests are Actually Being Saved?, 14
The Forum 406 (1979).
2. 148 La. 674, 87 So. 515 (1921).
3. 190 La. 1060, 183 So. 349 (1939).
4. La. Civ. Code art. 2653 states: "A right is said to be litigious whenever there
exists a suit in contestation on the same."
5. La. R.S. 9:2721, 2756 (Supp. 1989).
6. 486 U.S. 466, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
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Professional Responsibility 7.2 and 1.3. The amendments, approved by
the Louisiana Supreme Court on June 15, 1989, are as follows:
Rule 7.2-Advertising
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3 a lawyer
may advertise services through public media such as the telephone
directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical, radio,
or television, or through written or recorded communications
not otherwise prohibited by Rule 7.3.
(b) A copy of recording of an advertisement or written com-
munication shall be kept for two years after its last decimination
along with a record of when and where it was used.
(c) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for
recommending the lawyer's services, except that a lawyer may
pay the reasonable cost of advertisements or communications
permitted by these rules and may pay the usual charges of a
lawyer referral service or other legal services organization, pro-
vided that such service or organization complies with the re-
quirements of Rules 7.1-7.4 inclusive.
(d) Any communication made pursuant to this rule shall include
the name of at least one lawyer responsible for its content.
Rule 7.3-Direct Contact with Prospective Clients
(a) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment, in person,
by a person-to-person verbal telephone contact, or through others
acting at his request, from a prospective client with whom the
lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship when a
significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's
pecuniary gain.
(b) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from a
prospective client through any means, even when not otherwise
prohibited by these rules, if:
(1) The prospective client has made known to the lawyer
a desire not to be solicited by the lawyer; or
(2) The solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment;
or
(3) The prospective client is known to the lawyer to be
represented by counsel, except where the client has initiated
contact with the lawyer.
(c) Written or recorded communication not otherwise prohibited
by these rules may be utilized provided:
(1) In the case of written communication, it is specifically
identified as advertising material both on the first page
containing any writing in the communication itself and on
any envelope in which it is transmitted in typesize at least




(2) In the case of recorded communication, it is specifically
identified as advertising material at the beginning of the
recording, at the end of the recording, and on any envelope
on which it is transmitted in typesize at least as large as
the largest type otherwise used in said recording or on said
envelope;
(3) The lawyer submits a copy of the written communication
to the Association at its executive office prior to or at the
time the material is first transmitted to any prospective
client.
The amendments clarify and place some specific prohibitions on
direct contact with prospective clients known to have need of legal
services. Even before Shapero, the Louisiana rules permitted the con-
tacting of persons known to need legal services through written com-
munication provided the communication was identified as advertising
material. The mechanics of identifying the communication as advertising
are more fully set out under the new rule, including typesize. More
important, however, are the prohibitions set forth in subparagraphs
(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of Rule 7.3 of the Model Rules. When used in
the context of the recent decision of 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney 7
subparagraph (b)(3) may result in both ethical complaints and civil suits
against the offending attorney for tortious interference with the attorney/
client contract. Insofar as the written communication is concerned, not
only must it have the word advertising on it and on the envelope, but
all of the contents of the communication must comply with Rules 7.1.
In other words, there must be no material misrepresentation of fact or
law in the communication and it generally must not be false or mis-
leading. The same general rules apply to any recorded communication.
Abuse of Process
When Model Rules 3.1-3.4 are read together with articles 863 and
1420 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, it is clear that the
justice system cannot be abused, even though the abuse may be helpful
to the client. Many abusive tactics are easily detected and should result
in swift sanction of the attorney guilty of the abuse. On the other hand,
sometimes it is very difficult to distinguish an abusive tactic from one
that is permitted by law, such as confirming a default against a defendant
whose attorney has for some reason failed to file responsive pleadings.
This was the situation in Thibodeaux v. Burton,' in which the Louisiana
7. 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989).
8. 538 So. 2d 1001 (La. 1989).
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Supreme Court split 4 to 3 on whether to grant a new trial for a
defendant against whom a default judgment in excess of $2,000,000 was
awarded. The very size of the claim would seem to have prevented the
entry of a default judgment. The Code of Civil Procedure, however,
does not differentiate according to the amount sued for when a con-
firmation is sought. According to the majority opinion, counsel for
plaintiffs seriously argued that he merely availed himself of the law on
his clients' behalf when he confirmed the default judgment. The defen-
dant had failed to timely answer the petition and had not presented a
reasonable excuse for the failure. The dissenting justices considered the
defendant's failure to provide an excuse for not filing responsive plead-
ings as the determinative factor. Neither the majority opinion nor the
dissenting opinions found any ill practices nor any violations of the
rules of professional conduct. The majority opinion simply stated that
the interest of justice required a new trial.
Some courts of appeal in similar cases reached different results from
Thibodeaux v. Burton. Design Associates, Inc. v. Charpentier9 was a
suit on an open account. Prior to the default judgment there had been
negotiation between the two opposing attorneys and the plaintiff's at-
torney had set a deadline for filing of responsive pleadings. The de-
fendant's attorney, though aware of the deadline, filed no pleadings
and the default was routinely entered. The plaintiff's attorney then waited
until the appeal time had expired before notifying the defendant's at-
torney of the signing of the judgment. The defendant contended that
this was an ill practice under article 2004 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
In deciding in favor of the plaintiff, the court stated that it was "re-
luctant to place an obligation on an attorney to advise his opposing
attorney about matters which he should know and where such advice
would infringe upon his own client's legal rights. ' 10
In Firmature v. Tommasi," the defendant argued that it would be
inequitable and unconscionable to enforce the default judgment entered
against him because his attorney simply neglected to file responsive
pleadings. During the trial of the action to nullify the default judgement,
the trial judge repeatedly expressed his personal opinion that a defendant
against whom a default judgment was taken because his attorney ne-
glected to file an answer to the suit should still be allowed his day in
court. Predictably, the trial judge declared the default judgment a nullity.
The court of appeal reversed, holding that there was no improper practice
or procedure committed by plaintiff's counsel. There had been absolutely
no communication between the parties' attorneys and therefore there
9. 537 So. 2d 1233 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 540 So. 2d 340 (1989).
10. Id. at 1238.
11. 533 So. 2d 1326 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
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was nothing on which the defendant or his counsel could have reasonably
relied as extending the courtesy of notice before taking a default judg-
ment. The only "ill practice" which resulted in the judgment was the
neglect of the defendant's attorney to file responsive pleadings. Article
2004 had no application in this instance.
In Coleman E. Adler & Sons, Inc. v. Waggoner,12 the defendant
filed an answer to the plaintiff's petition, but his attorney did not appear
on the scheduled trial date. The court permitted the plaintiff to introduce
evidence sufficient to prove its case and entered judgment. The defendant
perfected a devolutive appeal and urged that there had been a deprivation
of defendant's constitutional right to due process. It appears that de-
fendant's counsel was replaced by a new counsel who mailed her motion
to enroll to the clerk's office. For some unexplained reason, the judge
never did receive the motion and the motion was never included in the
record. As a result, defendant's second counsel was not notified of the
trial date, although notification was made to the first attorney. The
court nevertheless refused to set aside the judgment, pointing out that
it is the attorney's obligation to have the court recognize him or her
as the litigant's attorney of record and not the duty of the clerk of
court.
Finally we get to a case of clear abuse of process-Lusk v. Lusk. 3
In Lusk, it appeared that the attorneys for both plaintiff and defendant
were working together in order that an uncomplicated divorce might be
obtained. Unknown to the husband's attorney, however, changes were
made on supplemental and amended pleadings which were not reflected
on the copies sent to the husband's attorney. The changes included that
a demand of $5,940 in past due child support be made executory. That
judgment remained in effect for some five years before an attempt to
enforce it was made by the same attorney for the plaintiff. The husband's
attorney obtained a temporary restraining order to prevent the execution
of the judgment and also sought to have it set aside for fraud and ill
practice. The court had no difficulty in deciding that court documents
were forged to obtain an illegal judgment and set aside the judgment
assessing all costs against the wife's attorney.
Older attorneys, who have long practiced under the assumption that
duty to their client was first and foremost and confidentiality between
the attorney and client inviolate, must now recognize that this emphasis
has changed and that the attorney's duty to the system of justice and
to others are now equally important and must be carefully considered
before any action is taken. The amendment of article 863 and article
12. 538 So. 2d 1131 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
13. 536 So. 2d 468 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1988).
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1420 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as interpreted in Thomas v. Capital
Security Services, Inc.,' 4 make it clear that there are no longer any "free
passes" for attorneys and litigants who violate Rule 11. Once a violation
is established the rule mandates the application of sanctions. The Thomas
case is perhaps the most comprehensive explanation of the workings of
Rule 11 handed down by the Fifth Circuit. In the opinion of this writer
it is "must reading" for every practicing attorney.
Conflict of Interest
Many of the conflict of interests cases in the past year have arisen
in the criminal context. It would seem obvious that an attorney who
has represented a defendant accused of a crime could not thereafter
terminate that representation, assume the mantel of assistant district
attorney, and appear on behalf of the state against the same defendant.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 680 clearly forbids such
a switching of sides, as do the ethical standards set forth in Rule 1.9
and 1.11. In State v. Devereaux,5 the criminal defendant's first attorney
participated in the sentencing hearing against his former client after
becoming an assistant district attorney. The state contended that there
was no actual prejudice; however, the court concluded that it was not
necessary to show actual prejudice when there was such a clear switching
of sides in an identical matter. In State v. Chavez,'6 the Devereaux case
was cited with approval although the court found that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to request a recusal of his
first attorney. Were it not for the waiver, the matter would have been
remanded to the trial court for resentencing. The appellate court pointed
out that the most effective means of avoiding the type of problems
presented in the Chavez and Devereaux cases was simply for a state
attorney to decline to represent the state against a criminal defendant
who was a former client.
Finally, in State v. Allen, 7 the supreme court was faced with a
similar matter. In Allen the accused's first attorney had not participated
in a criminal action against his former client. However, that attorney
had represented the accused in bankruptcy proceedings that the court
found to be substantially related to the later criminal prosecution. The
court cited with approval the substantial relationship test adopted by
the federal courts in cases such as Arkansas v. Dean Foods Products
Company, 8 finding that the lower court erred in refusing to recuse the
14. 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
15. 537 So. 2d 804 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
16. 540 So. 2d 992 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
17. 539 So. 2d 1232 (La. 1989).
18. 605 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1979).
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assistant district attorney who had formerly represented the defendant
in the bankruptcy proceedings. The conviction and sentences were re-
versed and the case remanded for a new trial.
Sometimes overlooked by attorneys is the imputed disqualification
rule, set forth in Rule 1.10, which provides that while lawyers are
associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client
when another member of the firm would be prohibited from doing so
by the other rules concerning conflict of interests. The supreme court
reviewed the imputation rules in In re J.M.P., 19 which was an adoption
case occurring prior to the amendment of Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:422.7. The majority, over a vigorous dissent by Justice Calogero,
found that if any conflict existed, it did not influence or induce any
error on the surrendering mother. Justice Calogero concluded that even
prior to the amendment the law required completely independent counsel,
excluding any member of the same firm in which the attorney for the
adopting parents was a member.
A case which created some shock waves among the members of the
bar during the past year was Succession of Cloud,20 which involved a
conflict of interest between the attorney's personal interest and the
interest of his client, a situation controlled by Rule 1.8. The arrangement
in Cloud was similar to that of Huey P. Long and his client in the
McClung v. Atlas Oil Company2' case which had been affirmed in
Gautreaux v. Harang.2 2 Article 2447 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which
prohibits an attorney from purchasing litigious rights, did not prevent
an attorney from acquiring an interest in his client's genuinely disputed
claim to immovable property when no suit was pending at the time of
the acquisition. In Cloud, the client had no money to pay his attorney
and, consequently, it was agreed that the client would transfer an interest
in the immovable property to the attorney in return for services pre-
viously performed and to be performed. The transfer was accomplished
and recorded prior to any lawsuit being filed by the siblings of the
client. 23 The opinion stated that several members of the court were
inclined to reconsider Gautreaux v. Harang, but a unanimous court,
with Justice Cole concurring, decided to rely on the provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Disciplinary Rule 5-103
(A), to nullify the contract rather than seek to redefine "litigious right"
under article 2447. Disciplinary Rule 5-103 provided that a lawyer shall
not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter
19. 528 So. 2d 1002 (La. 1988).
20. 530 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1988).
21. 148 La. 674, 87 So. 515 (1921).
22. 190 La. 1060, 183 So. 349 (1939).
23. Consequently, the attorney now had the public records doctrine on his side also.
La. R.S. 9:2721 & 9:2756 (Supp. 1989).
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of litigation he is conducting for his client. The same rule is set forth
in Model Rule 1.8 (J). The only exceptions to the rule are the right of
the attorney to acquire a lien granted by law to secure his fees or
expenses, or enter into a reasonable contingent fee with his client in a
civil case. What may disturb attorneys the most was the conclusion by
the court that the siblings of the client had a cause of action to seek
the nullity of the contract between their sibling and her attorney. These
siblings could not be injured by the contract because had they won,
the attorney's interest would have come from the sister's own forced
interest. It is extremely difficult to understand how the siblings had any
cause of action, whether under article 2447 or the ethical rules.
Malpractice
In this area there are two burning questions: (1) may a third party
with whom the attorney has no contract bring a malpractice action
against him and (2) if so, what are the standards against which the
conduct of the attorney is measured?
The "privity of contract" concept, which precluded suits by third
parties against attorneys, has either abrogated or eroded in most states.
In Louisiana, the court in Woodfork v. Sanders24 relied on the contract
theory of stipulation pour aut.rui in order to give the third party an
action. In Succession of Killingsworth,25 however, the court chose to
hinge its decision on article 2315, the general negligence article of the
civil code. In Evans v. Evans,2 6 the court simply assumed that a legatee
who lost his legacy because of the negligence of the attorney who drafted
the will had a cause of action, without elaborating on whether it was
in contract or in tort.
Woodfork, Killingsworth, and Evans all dealt with the rights of a
legatee who would have inherited but for the negligence of the attorney
who drafted the will for the decedent. But consider the situation where
a third party is injured by an action taken by an attorney for his client
which coincidentally happens to damage a third party. Shaw v. Everett,27
an unpublished decision of the fourth circuit, is such a case. Not only
did the court conclude that a cause of action existed, but also that the
attorney's conduct should be measured against the Code of Professional
Responsibility rather than the standard adopted in Ramp v. St. Paul
Fire and Marine Insurance Company,28 which was followed recently by
Houillon v. Powers and Nass.29
24. 248 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 252 So. 2d 455 (1971).
25. 270 So. 2d 196 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
26. 410 So. 2d 729 (La. 1982).
27. No. C.A.-8615 (La. App. 4th Cir. March 10, 1988), writ denied, 531 So. 2d
272, 275 (1988).
28. 269 So. 2d 239 (La. 1972).
29. 530 So. 2d 680 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
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The players in this action were Jill Shaw, former wife of Lloyd
Azcona, who filed suit against W. Paul Anderson and Gary P. Rouse,
both attorneys who had represented various parties to a promissory note.
The note had originally been owned by Lloyd Azcona and his brother
Rene Azcona and the makers of the note were Curtis Everett and Billy
Ray Eubank. Defendant Rouse represented Rene Azcona and defendant
Anderson represented Billy Eubank. The promissory note involved in
the dispute between Jill Shaw and her former husband, Lloyd Azcona,
was placed in the registry of the court pursuant to a concursus action
filed by Jill Shaw. While the note was held in the registry of the court,
the makers wanted to discharge the debt. Because the note was secured
by a real estate mortgage, they wished to obtain it in order to present
it to the clerk of court for cancellation of the mortgage. Henry Klein,
also a defendant in the principle action though not involved in this
exception, but who represented Lloyd Azcona, presented to a civil district
court judge who was not the one allotted to the concursus proceeding
a motion that would permit the withdrawal of the promissory note.
According to the opinion, Klein assured the judge that there were no
objections to the withdrawal. This was probably true because no one,
not even Jill Shaw, wished to impede the payment of the note. The
problem developed later when the proceeds from the payment were
distributed rather than returned to the registry of the court. This damaged
the plaintiff inasmuch as she was an alleged assignee of her husband's
part of the note. The present litigation was instituted by Shaw seeking
payment of her one-half interest as well as damages for the alleged acts
of the various parties in depriving her of the proceeds and the security
of the mortgage. Defendants Anderson and Rouse filed exceptions of
no cause of action which were sustained in the trial court but reversed
on appeal. The appellate court set forth the issue as whether a non-
client can assert a claim for damages against an attorney for the negligent
breach of a professional obligation he owes the court, his profession,
and the public. The court referred to Model Rules 1.2, 1.15, and 3.3
and said those rules set forth an attorney's responsibilities to his client,
the courts, and the public. The court further stated:
[Wie know of no rule of law which mandates disciplinary action
as a sole means of redress. The rules of professional conduct
do not exist in a vacuum. Their intent is to provide the standard
of conduct by which the legal profession is to conduct itself
with relation to clients, the judicial system and the public. And,
one may negligently or intentionally breach those rules. A party
aggrieved by a breach should be able to seek redress through
the courts.30
30. No. C.A.-8615 (La. App. 4th Cir. March 10, 1988), writ denied, 531 So. 2d
272, 275 (1988).
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The court in Shaw did not mention or distinguish in any way the
earlier case of Reed v. Verwoerdt,3" where the court held that the proper
standard for malpractice was that set forth in Ramp v. St. Paul Fire
and Marine Insurance Company 2 and not the Code of Professional
Responsibility. "
It is interesting to compare the above case with Scott v. Thomas3 4
and Evans v. Detweiler,35 which summarized the elements necessary to
prove a claim for legal malpractice as follows: (1) that there was an
attorney/client relationship; (2) that the attorney was negligent in his
representation of the client; and (3) that this negligence caused plaintiff
some loss.
36
There were at least fifteen other reported legal malpractice cases
during the past year. At least three of these were decided on the basis
of prescription in favor of the attorney; the court in each instance
applied the one year prescriptive period.17 Several others were decided
in favor of the attorney because the advice given by the particular
attorney at the time was the result of the proper exercise of skill and
professional judgment even though hindsight or subsequent judicial de-
cisions cast doubt upon the advice.3 8
In Kirsch v. New England Insurance Company,39 a motion for
summary judgment in favor of the attorney was granted because at the
time the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant attorney
had ended. There was still time within which the action could have been
filed. Therefore, the court held that the ultimate prescription of the
plaintiff's previous lawsuit was not the fault of the defendant attorney.
The supreme court granted writs without a hearing, reversed the appellate
court, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. 40
31. 490 So. 2d 421 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
32. 269 So. 2d 239 (La. 1972).
33. For a lengthy discussion of whether or not the model rules should be used as
the basis for civil liability for attorneys, see Note, The Rules of Professional Conduct:
Basis for Civil Liability of Attorneys, 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 777 (1987) and the other articles
and cases cited therein.
34. 543 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
35. 466 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
36. The decision in Penalber v. Blount, 550 So. 2d 577 (La. 1989), attempts to
reconcile these decisions by distinguishing between malpractice (negligence) and intentional
tort by an attorney who violates constitutional, statutory, or professional rules deliberately.
37. Bolton v. New England Ins. Co., 542 So. 2d 135 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989);
Norwood v. Fish, 537 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989); Law v. Mayeux, 527 So. 2d
37 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
38. Quarles Drilling v. General Accident Ins., 538 So. 2d 1029 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1989); Louisiana Bank and Trust Co. v. Anderson, 526 So. 2d 1386 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1988); Drury v. Fawer, 527 So. 2d 423 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
39. 532 So. 2d 922 (La. App. 5th Cir.), rev'd, 534 So. 2d 439 (1988).
40. 534 So. 2d 439 (La. 1988).
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Similarly, in Dixon v. Perlman,'4 a motion for summary judgment was
reversed and the case remanded to the trial court because the appellate
court found that the attorneys, for purposes of filing the action and
interrupting prescription, relied on notes of unknown origin in the file
pertaining to the accident date to the exclusion of further independent
investigation. This, said the court, presented a genuine issue of material
fact as to the reasonableness of this reliance.
The other reported cases involving actions against attorneys were
either dismissed on no cause of action exceptions or decided in favor
of the attorney on a motion for summary judgment.4 2 Finally, in Dale
v. Carriere,43 it was held that the duties of a notary public are not that
of an attorney and that there is no law in Louisiana which required a
notary to give inspection for legal flaws and to guarantee the validity
of every document which he notarizes when he is hired only in his
capacity as a notary and not as a drafter or guarantor of the validity
of such documents.
It is apparent from the above cases that malpractice actions are
continuing to increase and that the areas of alleged malpractice have
broadened. Obvious neglect by the attorney causing injury to the client
is no longer required. All manner of perceived shortcomings on behalf
of the attorney now appear actionable.
Attorneys' Fees
The contingent fee statute, Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:218, has
been the subject of much litigation. It was adopted many years prior
to the advent of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the later
model rules. The statute appeared to give an attorney the right to acquire
a proprietary interest in the subject matter of the suit and also seemed
to prevent the termination of his services by his client. This result
occurred because neither the attorney nor the client could settle, com-
promise, or discontinue the lawsuit without the consent of the other.
After the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969,
the Louisiana Supreme Court, in a trilogy of decisions, interpreted
Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:218 in such a fashion as not to conflict
with the ethical rules. 44 As interpreted, the attorney gained not a pro-
41. 528 So. 2d 637 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).
42. Lebleu v. Mitchell, 542 So. 2d 841 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989); Olympia Roofing
Co., Inc. v. Henican, 534 So. 2d 16 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988); Executive Recruitment,
Inc. v. Guste, Barnett and Shushan, 533 So. 2d 129 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
43. 537 So. 2d 356 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
44. Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Products, Inc., 373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1979); Calk v.
Highland Const. & Mfg., 376 So. 2d 495 (La. 1979); Scott v. Kemper Ins. Co., 377 So.
2d 66 (La. 1979).
19891
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
prietary interest in the subject matter of the suit, but a privilege on the
fund which the satisfaction of the client's claim yields. In addition, the
court recognized the client's absolute right to discharge his attorney
despite the existence of a contingency fee contract and further held that
the attorney could not prevent or void a client settlement made without
that attorney's consent.
The above cases were reviewed in Neeley v. Hollywood Marine,
Inc. ,4 a case which involved a young seaman who had suffered a
maritime personal injury. In Neeley, the plaintiff himself negotiated a
settlement with the defendant, Hollywood Marine, Inc., even though he
had originally retained counsel. Subsequent to his settlement of the case,
he dictated a letter to his former counsel dismissing him. The defendant
then filed the signed motion for dismissal together with the compromise
and release agreement, both of which had been executed by the plaintiff
himself without benefit of counsel. The plaintiff's former counsel then
intervened alleging the nullity of the settlement agreement because plain-
tiff was unrepresented and also alleging that the settlement was grossly
inadequate. In addition, the attorneys sought reimbursement for the
medical expenses paid on behalf of the plaintiff and sought to enforce
their contingent fee contract concerning attorneys' fees. The majority
ultimately decided that Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:218 and the ju-
risprudence interpreting the same were not determinative because of the
special recognition of a seaman as a ward of the court and the fact
that releases and compromises by such wards are subject to careful
scrutiny. That scrutiny not having been given here, the judgment dis-
missing the plaintiff's suit and the order granting defendant's summary
judgment dismissing the intervention were both reversed and the matter
was remanded to the trial court.
In the regular legislative session of 1989, both Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:5001 and 37:218, relative to attorney fee privileges, were
amended by Act No. 78. The purpose seems to have been to define
the term "professional fees" contained in Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:5001 and the term "fee" contained in 37:218. No other changes were
made although both provisions were amended and reenacted in toto.
One can only surmise why the legislature did not amend 37:218 so as
to conform with the supreme court's interpretation in Saucier, Calk,
and Kemper. The first paragraph of Section 218 still appears to authorize
the attorney to acquire as his fee an interest in the subject matter of
the suit and protects him from being dismissed by giving him the right
to void any settlement or compromise to which he did not consent.
45. 530 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1988).
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In Jackson Parish Bank v. Durbin4 6 the court followed Central
Progressive Bank v. Bradley47 and concluded that the court had the right
to inquire into the reasonableness of an attorney fee stipulated in the
promissory note. The court cited the provisions of Model Rule 1.5
concerning the factors which are used to determine a reasonable fee
and then concluded that the fee awarded by the trial court was excessive
for the amount of work performed by the plaintiff's attorney as revealed
by the record. It further concluded that it was not necessary to remand,
as the record reflected a sufficient basis for fixing the fee. A 25%
attorney fee was reduced to 15%.
In LeBlanc v. Theriot,48 a discharged attorney who had a contingent
fee contract with his former client recorded his contract, apparently
seeking to have his lien rights recognized against the property of his
former client's separated husband, which the husband had obtained in
a property settlement. The attorney's theory was that the proceeds of
the settlement, on which he had a privilege under Louisiana Revised
Statutes 37:218, were disbursed and divided in the property settlement.
The separated husband filed a mandamus action to cancel the contract
insofar as it might affect his property. The trial court denied the hus-
band's action but the appellate court reversed, holding that the attorney
was attempting to extend the protective mechanisms of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 37:218 beyond the express language of the provision. Such lien
rights could not be asserted in an action different from that to which
his contract pertained; that is, he could not switch the enforcement of
his lien rights from a tort action to a separation proceeding.
Another interesting decision is First Security Bank & Trust Co. v.
Dooley.49 This case considered a question which has arisen before con-
cerning the attorney fee on a promissory note: who owns the attorney
fees? In a judgment of separation, the court in Dooley set the amount
of attorneys' fees which would be payable to certain law firms for the
representation in a contested separation. In the meantime, First Security
Bank & Trust Co. had obtained and recorded a judgment. Therefore,
the primary issue presented to the court involved a question of the
ranking of the attorney fee awards in the separation judgment with
relation to a subsequently recorded judgment in favor of a community
creditor. First Security argued that the attorney fee award belonged to
the litigants rather than to the attorney and was consequently subject
to compensation and set-off. The attorneys, on the other hand, argued
that the attorney fee belonged to them and that under the provisions
46. 535 So. 2d 1074 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).
47. 502 So. 2d 1017 (La. 1987).
48. 542 So. 2d 808 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
49. 535 So. 2d 898 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).
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of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5001 the attorneys had a special privilege
that outranked the bank. The bank quickly pointed out, however, that
9:5001 confers a privilege on property recovered by the efforts of the
attorneys and in this case there was no recovery of property. The court
also mentioned in passing the ethical dilemma of an attorney having to
intervene in every case where attorneys' fees are stipulated by contract
or statute in order to protect his interest. The court then concluded
that the issue was one of first impression and because of strong policy
reasons the attorney fee awards would be recognized as privileged debts
of the community by a judgment recorded in the mortgage records prior
to the bank's judgment and would, consequently, prime or outrank the
bank's judgment. The writer is still of the opinion, expressed earlier,50
that an award is in favor of the litigant whether awarded in a lump
sum amount or divided into principal, interest, attorneys' fees, and
costs.
Effective Assistance of Counsel
In two supreme court cases, decided on the same day, ineffective
assistance of counsel was an issue. In State ex rel Busbee v. Butler,'
the defendant contended that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
in both the guilt and sentencing phase of his trial. In State v. Messiah,"2
it was the penalty phase which prompted the assignment of error. Both
decisions refer to Strickland v. Washington, 3 which held that the accused
must not only show that counsel's performance was deficient but also
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Insofar as the
deficient performance is concerned, Louisiana has adopted the "rea-
sonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as a diligent con-
scientious advocate" standard for evaluating an attorney's representation.
The second part of the Strickland test requires that the prejudice be
actual prejudice rather than presumed prejudice. As pointed out by
Justice Calegoro in Messiah, representation is an art and an act of
omission that is unprofessional in one case may be considered sound
or even brilliant in another. Second-guessing, therefore, is not the func-
tion of the appellate court. In the Butler case, the attorney in his closing
argument made no plea for the defendant's life and further stated that
if the jury gave the death sentence they should do so with the appre-
ciation that it would be carried out. The court found this to be con-
stitutionally defective and then went on to find actual prejudice in not
50. Mengis, Professional Responsibility, Developments in the Law, 1987-1988, 48 La.
L. Rev. 437 (1987).
51. 538 So. 2d 164 (La. 1988).
52. 538 So. 2d 175 (La. 1988).
.53. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
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presenting mitigating circumstances of mental impairment which might
have persuaded the jury not to sentence the defendant to death. The
closing argument in the Messiah case was also very brief and was
primarily a plea for mercy with heavy reliance on biblical references.
The court distinguished the Butler case, handed down the same day,
because the record in Messiah did not indicate the existence of any
witnesses who might have been helpful and no evidentiary hearing had
been held. The court was unable to conclude that counsel's brief but
passionate plea for mercy, without more, constituted ineffective repre-
sentation. With this conclusion Chief Justice Dixon vigorously dissented,
joined by Justice Dennis. It seems to be a close call and the majority
opinion left the door open for presentation of additional evidence in a
post-conviction hearing.
Discipline
It is suspected that the only contact most Louisiana lawyers have
with the system of discipline is an occasional reading of an LSBA case
in the advance sheets or a glance at the report of the Committee on
Professional Responsibility which is published in the Louisiana Bar
Journal. Many practitioners do not realize that approximately 2000
complaints are received annually at the State Bar Association's Head-
quarters and that thousands of files may be pending at any given time.
This prompted the Supreme Court of Louisiana to invite the Standing
Committee on Professional Discipline of the American Bar Association
to conduct an onsite evaluation of Louisiana's disciplinary system. This
visit was made on January 14-16, 1987 and in July of 1987. A final
report of the evaluation of the committee was sent to the court. There-
after, the court appointed a special committee of members of the Louis-
iana State Bar Association to evaluate the Association's disciplinary
procedure in light of the report of the ABA.
The report and recommendations to the Louisiana Supreme Court
by the committee to evaluate the Louisiana State Bar Association Dis-
ciplinary Procedures were filed with the court in June of 1989 and are
presently being considered. The report is lengthy and only what the
writer considers the most important recommendations will be mentioned.
First, both committees (ABA and LSBA) recommended that the
functions of the executive counsel (presently Mr. Tom Collins) be divided
and that a chief disciplinary counsel be hired to perform all prosecutorial
functions and to generally oversee the disciplinary system. It was strongly
recommended, however, that the disciplinary system remain an integral
part of the Louisiana State Bar Association rather than have it severed
as some state Bar Associations have done.
In addition, it was recommended by both committees that the func-
tion of the commissioner be abolished and that either the professional
responsibility committee or a panel thereof, upon conclusion of the
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investigatory hearing, make findings of fact and recommendations con-
cerning sanctions which would be considered by the supreme court in
the event a suit for suspension or disbarment was later filed.
The ABA Committee also recommended that at least one-third of
the members of the professional responsibility committee, which now
numbers twelve, be non lawyers. A majority of the state committee did
not support this recommendation because service on the committee re-
quires dedication to the practice of law, as well as considerable expertise.
Another recommendation made by the ABA Committee was that a
case tracking system should be put in place so that at any given moment
the status of an open file could be ascertained. Of course, this rec-
ommendation requires the installation of computers in the New Orleans
Bar Association office. On August 26, 1989 the Board of Governors of
the Louisiana State Bar Association authorized the expenditure of $55,000
for this purpose.
It is the opinion of this writer that these improvements will help
to reduce the time lag from the opening of a file to the final disposition
and thereby achieve greater fairness to the lawyers involved and greater
confidence in the system by the parties complaining.
In addition to the above recommendations, the ABA Committee
recommended that article 15 of the Louisiana State Bar Association
Articles of Incorporation be amended to include probation as a sanction.
Note that in L.S.B.A. v. Longenecker5 4 the Supreme Court of Louisiana,
in recognizing that there were no provisions for probation in the dis-
ciplinary procedure, went on to impose a period of probation of two
years, finding that probation is appropriate when there is very little
likelihood that the lawyer will cause harm to the public during the period
of rehabilitation and when the probation can be adequately supervised.
In its opinion, the court referred to the Standards for Lawyers Sanction
which were approved by the American Bar Association in February of
1986. In recent years, the supreme court has often relied on these
sanctions to arrive at an appropriate punishment for the lawyers who
have violated the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility.
A review of the published opinions in disciplinary cases over the
past year indicates that the leading cause for suspension or disbarment
is still a deliberate or negligent co-mingling of client funds with those
of the attorney."
54. 538 So. 2d 156 (La. 1988).
55. L.S.B.A. v. White, 538 So. 2d 256 (La. 1989); L.S.B.A. v. Dumaine, 538 So.
2d 270 (La. 1989); L.S.B.A. v. Hayling, 529 So. 2d 1 (La. 1988); L.S.B.A. v. Alker,
530 So. 2d 1138 (La. 1988); L.S.B.A. v. Longenecker, 532 So. 2d 1143 (La. 1988);
L.S.B.A. v. Boddie, 534 So. 2d 944 (La. 1988); L.S.B.A. v. Young, 534 So. 2d 948 (La.
1988). amended. 542 So. 2d 490 (La. 1989).
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It is provided in Rule 8.4 (g) of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to fail to
cooperate with the committee on professional responsibility in the com-
mittee's investigation of alleged misconduct, except upon the expressed
assertion of a constitutional privilege. This puts the accused attorney in
somewhat of a quandary because the United Stated Supreme Court in
1968 held that disciplinary procedures are quasi criminal 6 and a year
earlier had held that an attorney could not be disbarred solely on the
grounds that he had invoked the privilege against self incrimination.1 7
On the other hand, the Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently held
that disciplinary procedures are not criminal and that a lawyer charged
with violation of professional ethics is not entitled to the "full panoply"
of a criminal defendant's rights. In L.S.B.A. v. Chatelain,5 the court
held that an attorney's client account records could be seized because
they were records required to be kept under Rule 1.15.1 9
The ABA Committee recommended, and the State Bar Committee
concurred, that the Supreme Court of Louisiana should amend its rules
to provide that upon application of counsel and with the approval of
the appropriate prosecuting authority, the court may grant immunity
from a criminal prosecution to a witness in a lawyer disciplinary pro-
ceeding. This would seem to be a just corollary to requiring an attorney
accused of professional misconduct to assist in the investigation leading
toward his own sanction.
Conclusion
Lawyers who have been disappointed by the continual erosion of
what they consider to be their "profession" received another jolt in
March of 1989 with the opinion in Mire v. City of Lake Charles. 6 In
this matter, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a municipality's
occupational license tax on attorneys was neither unconstitutional nor
a usurpation of the supreme court's exclusive authority to regulate the
practice of law. The trial court had held that the municipal ordinance
was unconstitutional as it imposed an income tax in violation of Article
7, § 4c of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. The supreme court
reversed, concluding that the tax or license imposed was an indirect tax
whereas an income tax is a direct tax. The court went on to say that
a license to practice law neither confers immunity from taxation nor
does it exempt an attorney from his duties of citizenship such as sharing
56. In Re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S. Ct. 1222 (1968).
57. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 87 S. Ct. 625 (1967).
58. 513 So. 2d 1178 (La. 1987).
59. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 1375 (1948).
60. 540 So. 2d 950 (La. 1989).
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the expenses of government. Only Justice Watson dissented, holding the
view that such ordinances could determine how, where, or whether an
attorney can practice law, which is a definite encroachment on the
supreme court's authority to regulate the practice of law in general.
From United States v. Dillon6l we learn:
An applicant for admission to practice law may justly be deemed
to be aware of the traditions of the profession which he is
joining, and to know that one of these traditions is that a lawyer
is an officer of the court obligated to represent indigents for
little or no compensation upon court order. Thus the lawyer
has consented to, and assumed, this obligation and when he is
called upon to fulfill it, he cannot contend that it is a "taking
of his services." 62
So once again it seems that a lawyer is just a tradesman or businessman
when it comes to license taxes, but is an "officer of the court" when
it comes to representing the indigent.
61. 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978, 86 S. Ct. 550 (1966).
62. Id. at 635.
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